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Abstract
This paper extends the DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) signaling model from single sales to portfolio sales.
It shows that the extended model can account for retention of low quality assets and help explain why
retained assets may be of varying quality.
Keywords: Securitization, Signaling, Skin in the game
JEL: D82, G21, G23
1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that, in the presence of asymmetric information, banks may retain a proportion
of the securities they sell in order to signal asset quality. That is, they keep a ‘skin in the game’. DeMarzo
and Duffie (1999) provide a model to show how this skin in the game is inversely related to asset quality
and that the lowest quality asset is not retained. A number of studies (see, for example, Chen et al., 2008;
Demiroglu and James, 2012) provide empirical evidence supporting the prediction of an inverse relation
between retention and asset quality. On the other hand, Acharya et al. (2009) provides contradictory
evidence that assets with the highest risk (the lowest quality) are nearly always retained.
Another implication of the DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) model is that securities sold will be homo-
geneous in terms of quality. In particular, DeMarzo (2005) demonstrates that when sellers have better
information about assets than potential buyers, they are better off selling them separately rather than
pooling them together. The intuition is that pooling reveals no information to buyers – it destroys infor-
mation, and therefore cannot be beneficial for sellers. The empirical support for this prediction is mixed.
Gorton and Metrick (2013) find that securities sold are broadly of homogeneous quality. Keys et al.
(2010), on the contrary, suggest that within broad categories of risk, there is considerable heterogeneity
of quality within the securities sold.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) model to explain why assets of
low quality might be retained and why the retained securities may involve assets of varying quality. We
do this by allowing for multiple assets and allowing banks to sell securities as portfolios. We show that
as long as banks can commit to the menu of contracts that they offer to investors, or commit to sell their
whole portfolio of assets, then there are parameter values such that portfolio sales dominate single asset
sales and the securities sold can be of varying and low quality.
We present the model in Section 2. We consider a bank whose assets are a portfolio of two loans.
Loans are sold to investors in a competitive market. All agents are risk neutral and therefore, prices
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are equal to the conditional expected value. Each loan can be either high-quality (high probability of
repayment) or low-quality. Returns on the two loans are assumed to be independently distributed. With
two loans and two loan types, there are three possible portfolio types: both loans are high quality (a
portfolio we label as H), one is high quality and the other is low quality (M), or both are low quality (L).
As in Shleifer and Vishny (2010), a bank makes profits by collecting fees when offering loans for sale.
The funds the bank obtains from these sales are reinvested in taking on new loans. There is asymmetric
information between sellers and buyers: the bank knows the quality of each loan on its books but investors
cannot observe loan quality at the time of sale (the bank does not know the loan quality before bringing
loans onto its books). Since there is asymmetric information, the bank may wish to signal the quality of
loans by retaining a fraction of the loan on its books along the lines suggested by DeMarzo and Duffie
(1999).
In Section 3 we replicate a result of DeMarzo (2005) that, other things being equal, banks are better off
selling loans separately rather than selling them together as a portfolio (see Proposition 1). The intuition
for this result is straightforward. Selling loans singly requires only one signal: that a loan is high quality.
Selling loans as a portfolio requires two signals to distinguish the three portfolio types. Since signaling
is costly, it is preferable to sell loans singly. Although this result can be found in DeMarzo (2005) and is
straightforward, we present it in detail because it aids the understanding of subsequent results.
Section 4 extends the analysis by allowing banks to pool together a mix of two of the three possible
portfolios. It presents our main result (Theorem 1) that describes when pooling a mix of two portfolios is
optimal.2 The advantage of pooling two portfolios is that it requires only one signal, reducing signaling
costs compared to signaling three types of portfolio. It may also be preferable to selling loans singly.
For example, pooling together portfolios M and L involves a signal only if both loans are of high quality,
whereas selling the loans singly requires a signal even when only one of the loans is of high quality. There
is however, a disadvantage for the bank in pooling a mix of portfolios. Using a mix of portfolios changes
the incentive constraints that must be satisfied for a signaling strategy to be credible. This may increase
the cost of the required signal. We show that if the fee is high, then the bank will prefer to sell the loans
together. If the fee is low, then the bank prefers to retain the high quality loan than to mix portfolios
and, thus, it will sell loans singly. For intermediate values of the fee, the bank finds it optimal to pool a
mix of the portfolios M and L or a mix of the portfolios H and L.
It may seem odd that a bank may wish to pool portfolios H and L. However, the skin in game increases
with the difference in the quality between the two assets. The difference between the expected payoff
from pooling the two portfolios H (two high quality loans) and L (two two quality loans) compared with
the expected payoff from portfolio M (one low quality and one high quality loan) is relatively small. Thus,
the bank can signal the difference by retaining only a small fraction of the pooled portfolio. When this is
optimal, the fraction retained by the bank may include low quality loans. Taking an average over banks,
the retained asset will include both high and low quality loans. Theorem 1 describes parameter values
for which this is indeed optimal.
In addition to accounting for some observed retention strategies that are unexplained by DeMarzo
and Duffie (1999), our model also delivers a novel prediction about how retention strategies change
in response to uncertainty. During periods of increased uncertainty, it predicts that banks are more
likely to use pooling strategies. That is, securities sold are more heterogeneous in periods of increased
uncertainty. In Section 4, we explain in more detail the derivation of this prediction and suggest how it
might be empirically tested.
Our paper is closely related to other work on signaling that builds upon the seminal work of Leland
and Pyle (1977). This literature includes DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) mentioned
above. DeMarzo (2005) starts from a similar premise to our paper, namely that in the DeMarzo and
Duffie (1999) model, banks prefer to sell securities singly rather than as portfolios. DeMarzo (2005)
shows that banks may benefit from designing new securities that pool assets into tranches. In particular,
banks can tranche securities into a risk-free, senior security and a residual ‘equity’ claim where all the
2 Note that pooling here is used in the sense of game theory and does not mean that the bank is creating a new security.
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default risk is concentrated. This strategy has the advantage that it ameliorates the lemons problem for
the risk-free tranche, enabling banks to sell loans at a higher average price. In our model, there are only
two states and in the bad state both loans return nothing. With this assumption, it is not possible to
tranche assets in the way done by DeMarzo (2005). The DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) model has also been
extended to a dynamic environment by Hartman-Glaser (2017) (see also Page`s, 2013). Hartman-Glaser
(2017) shows that banks build a reputation over time that mitigates the power of retention as a signaling
device. Although our main result applies to the single-period model, we discuss how it might be extended
to a multiple-period context in Section 5. Our model does require some form of commitment (either to
a menu of contracts or to stand ready to sell the whole portfolio) by the seller. We are not the first to
use commitment to analyze securitization and portfolio sales. Gorton and Souleles (2007) argue that the
willingness of banks to subsidize special purpose vehicles by buying back low quality assets, a type of
‘implicit recourse’, can be interpreted as a form of commitment. In our model, the commitment of banks
to a menu of contracts plays a similar role.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives a preliminary
result, similar to DeMarzo (2005), that compares single asset sales and portfolio sales. The main result
of the paper is derived in Section 4. Section 5 considers how the model might be extended to multiple
rounds of sales and Section 6 analyzes an alternative form of commitment. We offer some final comments
in Section 7. Proofs not given in the text are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The Model
The economy lasts for one period and consists of banks and investors. All agents are risk-neutral.
Banks are identical and we can focus the analysis on the behavior of a single bank. At the beginning of
the period, the bank offers loans of unit size to finance two risky projects. There are two types of loans.
Loans of type j ∈ {h, l} repay R with probability pij and fail to repay anything with probability 1− pij ;
where pih > pil. We assume that both types of loans have positive net present value; βpilR > 1, where the
discount factor β captures the time preference, common to all agents. Let θ denote the probability that a
loan is of type h. Loan types are independently distributed. Let ψ := θpih+(1−θ)pil be the unconditional
probability that a loan repays R. The unconditional probability is relevant both for investors, who do
not know the loan type, and for the bank when taking new loans onto its books. With two loans there
are three portfolio types. With probability θ2 both loans are of type h (portfolio H); with probability
(1− θ)2 both loans are of type l (portfolio L) and with probability 2θ(1− θ) one of the loans is of type h
and the other loan is of type l (portfolio M). The probability θ and the size of the bank’s portfolio are
common knowledge to the bank and investors.
We assume that at the beginning of the period, before the bank learns its portfolio type, it commits
to a set of contracts for selling its portfolio to investors. We will show that this commitment maximizes
the bank’s ex ante payoff, allowing it to use a pooling sales strategy. Commitment is required because
such strategies will not necessarily maximize the bank’s ex post payoff once it has learned its portfolio
type. We will demonstrate that this commitment can explain the banks sells its loans as portfolios but
do not necessarily pool together all loans. After the announcement of sales contracts, the bank learns the
types of its loans (and, as a consequence, the type of its portfolio).3 This information is private. At this
point, the bank can either keep the loans on its books or it can try to sell them to investors. This market
for loans is assumed to be competitive. If sold, the bank can finance new loans. The bank collects a fee f
when it signs a new loan agreement. The role of the fee, as in Shleifer and Vishny (2010), is as a devise
to generate trade between the bank and outside investors at the start of the trading period. The bank
can also choose between selling the whole portfolio and single loan sales. When the bank keeps a loan
on its books, it has to wait until the end of the period to receive a payoff. In contrast, when the bank
3 The lag between the announcement and the learning of types captures the period during which the bank learns the type
of its portfolio (prime, sub-prime, etc.). The assumption that the bank knows the type of loans on its books after purchase
but does not know the loan type at the time it brings loans onto its books is clearly an extreme one. It is however, meant
to capture the idea that the bank has better information after it has kept a loan on its books for a while.
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sells the loan and uses the proceeds to make new loans it collects fees at the beginning of the period and
purchases a new loan of unknown type. Define φ := f + βψR to be the expected discounted payoff the
bank anticipates from selling a unit of loan: the arrangement fee from the new loan plus the expected
discounted return from the new loan. By assumption φ > 1. Investors observe the size of the bank’s
portfolio and its retention strategies but observe neither loan nor portfolio types.
Since investors do not observe the type of a loan, there is a lemons problem. The maximum amount
that investors are willing to pay for a loan is βpilR because if they offer to pay βψR (the expected loan
payoff), then the bank will only sell l type loans. Since keeping a loan on its books is costly in terms
of the fees forgone, the bank might be able to use a retention strategy, that is, keeping a fraction of a
loan on its books as skin in the game, to signal the quality of the loan to investors. DeMarzo and Duffie
(1999) show that the skin in the game, dq, for a given asset quality q, is given by
dq =
φ
(
pq
pq−
− 1
)
+ dq
−
(φ− 1)
φ
(
pq
pq−
)
− 1
(1)
where q− denotes the quality one level below q, and pq and pq− denote the competitive prices of the
corresponding assets. Furthermore, when q− is the lowest quality level, then dq
−
= 0: the lowest quality
is not retained. The equation will be explained more fully in the next section. Essentially, the higher the
quality of the loan, the lower is the cost of retaining it on the books. Therefore, banks signal quality by
keeping a skin in the game that is inversely related to loan quality.
3. Single Loans and Portfolio Sales
In this section, we compare single loan sales and portfolio sales. We present a key benchmark result
that in the absence of commitment, single loan sales dominate. This result was established by DeMarzo
(2005). Given that our set-up is different from DeMarzo (2005), we go through the analysis in detail
because it will help to understand the mixed pooling and signaling case presented in Section 4.
3.1. Single Loan Sales
In this subsection, we assume that the bank sells loans singly. An equilibrium may be either pooling
or separating. First, consider a separating equilibrium. Let dj denote the fraction of a loan of type j
that the bank is supposed to keep on its books and let pj denote the price of a loan of type j. The profit
to the bank with a loan of type i of retaining a fraction dj of the loan on its books is:
Uij := d
jβpiiR+ (1− dj)pjφ.
The first term is the bank’s expected payoff from keeping on its books a fraction dj of the loan that has
a success probability of pii. The second term is the sales revenues (1 − dj)pj from the fraction of the
loan not retained times the expected discounted payoff the bank anticipates from selling a unit of loan
φ = f +ψβR: that is, the arrangement fee f from the new loan plus the expected discounted return from
the new loan ψβR. Here the expected repayment probability of new loans is ψ because at the point of
purchase the bank is uncertain about the loan type.
The maximum price that an investor will pay for a loan of type j is βpijR: that is, the loan’s discounted
expected payoff. Given that the market for loans is competitive, the price of loans will be bid up to this
maximum value:
pj = βpijR for each j. (2)
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Lemma 1. Under a separating equilibrium of prices and retention strategies with single loan sales:
pl = βpilR, ph = βpihR,
dl = 0, dh = dˆh :=
φ
(
ph
pl
− 1
)
φ
(
ph
pl
)
− 1
=
φ (pih − pil)
φpih − pil . (3)
The expression for dh in equation (3) is the skin in the game retained by the bank to signal that
the loan is high quality. Since φ > 1 and pih > pil, d
h ∈ (0, 1). The intuition for the result is quite
straightforward. Since φ > 1 and the price received is given by (2), the bank will prefer, ceteris paribus,
to sell a loan rather than retain it. With two loans each of two types and, hence, three portfolio types,
there are six incentive constraints to ensure that the payoff from selling the loans according to the true
portfolio type is no less than the payoff from selling the loans as one of the other two portfolio types.
Despite there being six incentive constraints, it can be shown that the two relevant constraints are that
the bank with portfolio H (two loans of type h) prefers not to sell it as a portfolio L (two loans of type
l) and vice-versa. If these two constraints are satisfied, then so are all the others (see the appendix for
the full proof). This means that the analysis of the single loans case is identical to the case where the
bank has only one loan that can be of either high or low type. First, it is clear that there is no advantage
to have dl > 0 because signaling is costly. Therefore, for the bank selling all of its low type loan, its
expected payoff is Ull = plφ. Whereas, if it retains a fraction d
h and receives a price ph = βpihR for the
loans sold, its expected payoff is Ulh = d
hβpilR+ (1− dh)phφ = dhpl + (1− dh)phφ, since the value of the
loans retained is pl. Incentive compatibility requires both Ull ≥ Ulh and Uhh ≥ Uhl. Combining these
two conditions gives
dhph ≥
(
pl − (1− dh)ph
)
φ ≥ dhpl. (4)
Equivalently,
(ph − pl)φ
ph(φ− 1) ≥ dh ≥
(ph − pl)φ
phφ− pl .
It is clear that the most relevant constraint is that the bank should not wish to sell a low type loan as a
high type. This is the second inequality in (4). Where it is satisfied as equality (Ull = Ulh), the value of
dh is given by equation (3) in Lemma 1. An increase in φ reduces the required retention rate dˆh because
the cost of signaling is increased. A rise in the ratio of pih/pil has the opposite effect because it makes
passing off low quality loans as high quality more tempting and therefore the required retention rate to
signal high quality increases.
In principle, any prices satisfying (2) and dh satisfying (4) can be supported as a separating equilibrium
with investor beliefs that retention d < dh corresponds to a low quality loan and any d ≥ dh comes from a
high quality loan. However, as is standard, the separating equilibrium of Lemma 1 is the Pareto-dominant
separating equilibrium that also satisfies the intuitive criterion. To see this, suppose that dh satisfies (4)
and dh > dˆh. A bank with a low type loan will never choose such a dh. Thus, investors believe that any
such deviation to a lower dh must come from a high type and therefore can be sold for the high price ph.
Given that the bank’s payoff decreases with dh, the amount retained will be decreased until dh = dˆh.
Now, we consider the possibility of a pooling equilibrium. This requires that the bank has some form
of commitment to a selling strategy before it knows its portfolio type. We suppose that the bank can
commit to a menu of contracts conditional on sales taking place. We view the commitment as a short
cut to modeling repeated interactions that might generate similar effects endogenously. We will consider
a model with repeated interactions in Section 5. In Section 6, we will consider an alternative form of
commitment (which will turn out to be a stronger form of commitment) in which the bank commits to a
menu of contracts with each investor separately, but also commits to stand ready to sell all its loans. In
a pooling equilibrium, the bank will not keep any fraction of the loan on its books given that retention
is only beneficial if it can be used as a signal. Competition among investors means that in this case
the price of loan sales is bid up to βψR. For this to be an equilibrium, the bank must prefer to sell its
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loans rather than retaining them. For a loan of type l, the bank’s expected payoff from sales is φβψR
compared with βpilR from retention. Since φ > 1 and ψ > pil, it follows that sales are always better than
retention. On the other hand, if the bank sells a high quality loan to investors, its payoff will be φβψR
compared to βpihR from retention. Therefore, if φψ < pih the bank would prefer to keep the high quality
loan on its books rather than earning the pooling payoff. Thus, pooling cannot be an equilibrium when
φψ < pih. That is, when φ is low, in particular, when the fee f is low, the bank will sell the loans to
investors individually, using the skin in the game as a signal.
Now, consider the case when φψ ≥ pih, that is when φ, and in particular the fee f , is high. The bank’s
ex ante payoff from pooling, VP , is given by the value of selling all loans at the price of βψR:
VP = 2φβψR.
The bank’s ex ante payoff from signaling when the loans are sold separately, VS , is computed as the
weighted average of the payoff to each of the three possible portfolio types. Letting ρH := θ
2, ρM :=
2θ(1− θ) and ρL := (1− θ)2, the ex ante payoff from signaling is given by
VS = ρH2βpihR
(
dh + φ
(
1− dh))+ ρM (βpihR (dh + φ (1− dh))+βpilRφ)+ ρL2βpilRφ (5)
Comparing the two payoffs we find that
VP − VS = 2θpihβR (φ− 1) dh > 0.
This is not surprising given that signaling is costly. Thus, as long as pooling is feasible and the bank can
commit to a selling strategy, the bank will pool to sell its loans. When pooling is not feasible, the bank
uses costly signaling. In summary:
Lemma 2. Suppose that the bank sells each loan separately to investors. Then,
1. If φ < pihψ , then the bank will sell the loans using signaling.
2. If φ ≥ pihψ , then the bank will sell the loans using pooling.
3.2. Portfolio Sales
Now we allow the bank to bundle the two loans and sell them as a portfolio. The analysis of portfolio
sales follows closely the one above for single loan sales. Let di denote the fraction of a portfolio of type
i (i = H,M,L) that the bank keeps on its books. The maximum prices, that an investor will pay for
portfolios of type H, M and L are equal to 2βpihR, β(pih+pil)R and 2βpilR, respectively, which correspond
to the expected payoffs of these portfolios. To simplify notation, let pim := (1/2)(pih + pil). The following
results can be established.4
Lemma 3. Under a separating equilibrium of prices and retention strategies with portfolio loan sales:
pL = βpilR, pM = βpimR, pH = βpiHR, d
L = 0,
dM = dˆM :=
φ
(
pim
pil
− 1
)
φ
(
pim
pil
)
− 1
,
and
dH = dˆH :=
φ
(
pih
pim
− 1
)
+ dM (φ− 1)
φ
(
pih
pim
)
− 1
,
where dˆH > dˆM .
4 The proofs of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 are provided in a Supplementary Appendix.
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With three types of portfolios, the bank needs two signals to separate them. As stated in equation (1),
the skin in the game is decreasing with asset quality. It is also easy to establish that Lemma 2 also applies
to portfolio sales as well as sales on individual loans.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the bank can either keep the portfolios on its books or sell them to investors.
Then,
1. If φ < pihψ , then the bank will sell the portfolios to investors using signaling,
2. If φ ≥ pihψ , then the bank will sell the portfolios to investors using pooling.
As for the case of single loan sales, costly signaling is only used when pooling generates a lower
expected payoff.
The next result compares Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 to determine whether the bank will sell the loans
separately or as a portfolio (proof in the Appendix). It reproduces the result from DeMarzo (2005) that
the bank will prefer to sell loans singly to investors rather than as a pool of loans. The intuition is
straightforward. When the bank sells the loans singly, there are only two types to be separated. In
contrast, when the bank sells them as a pool, there are three portfolio types to be separated. Given that
signaling is costly, it is better to sell loans singly.
Proposition 1 (DeMarzo (2005)). Suppose that the bank can sell the loans either singly or as a port-
folio. Then, the bank will sell them singly to investors.
This result is an important benchmark. The fact that a bank has multiple loans does not in itself
provide an explanation for why banks may prefer to sell portfolios of loans.
4. Mixed Pooling and Signaling
DeMarzo (2005) offers an explanation for why banks may sell portfolios of loans. His explanation is
that banks can repackage loans into tranches of differing risk categories. By creating a tranche that is risk
free, a bank ameliorates the lemons problem for this tranche enabling it to sell loans at a higher average
price. As mentioned in the Introduction, this option is not feasible in our model because a risk-free
tranche cannot be created when the minimum payoff from each loan type is zero.
We offer an alternative explanation for why banks may pool loans and retain a proportion of loans
on their books. In particular, we consider a sales strategy that involves a mix of pooling portfolios and
signaling. Since there are three portfolio types in our model, we consider the case where a bank pools
two of these potential portfolios. The advantage of such a strategy is that the bank will only have to
separate two portfolios, the mixed portfolio and the unmixed portfolio, and therefore, will use only one
signal.
There are three potential portfolios mixes: a pool of portfolios H and M, which we label as HM, a
pool of portfolios H and L (HL) and a pool of portfolios M and L (ML). For example, a sales strategy
mix ML means that when the bank’s portfolio is type H, the bank signals it by using skin in the game
and, thus, separates it from the other two types, namely, M and L; But, when its portfolio is type M, it
does not use skin in the game as a signal and, thus, does not separate the type M portfolio from the type
L portfolio.
To calculate the skin in the game required for each mix let
piij :=
ρipii + ρjpij
ρi + ρj
denote the conditional probability of the successful outcome if the portfolio mix is ij, where i ∈ {H,M}
and j ∈ {M,L}, i 6= j.5 It follows straightforwardly (since ψ R pim and piHL R ψ for θ R 1/2) that
5 Note there is some abuse of notation here. The pii on the right hand side of the formula should be pih or pim depending
on whether the portfolio is i = H or i = M respectively.
7
piHM > pil, pih > piML and piHL R pim as θ R 1/2. The expected discounted value, per share, of the
portfolio mix ij is therefore βpiijR.
Since prices are competitive, the sale of the mix ij will yield a payoff to the bank of φβpiijR. This is
to be compared to a payoff from retaining the higher quality portfolio of βpiiR. If the bank can commit
to a selling strategy, as discussed in the previous section, then it will prefer to retain the higher quality
portfolio than the mix provided pii > φpiij . Thus, a necessary condition for the mixed portfolio ij to be
sold is
φpiij ≥ pii.
As we have seen in the previous section, signaling requires that the bank retain a fraction of the higher
quality asset on its books. For the mixed portfolio HM, this means retaining a fraction of the portfolio
HM. For the mixed portfolio ML, it means retaining a fraction of the high quality loan. For the mixed
portfolio HL, what is retained depends on the proportion of high quality and low quality loans. If θ > 1/2,
then the mix HL has more of the higher quality loans on average than portfolio M and the mix HL is
the higher quality asset which may be retained as a signal. If θ < 1/2, then the reverse is true and the
portolio M is the higher quality asset that may be retained as a signal. If θ = 1/2, then there is no need
to signal because the mix of portfolios H and L is exactly equivalent to portfolio M. Let dij denote the
fraction of the higher quality asset retained on the bank’s books to signal the portfolio mix ij and Uij
the corresponding expected payoff. It can be checked that
UHM = 2
(
(ρH + ρM )
(
dHM + φ(1− dHM ))βpiHMR+ ρLφβpilR) ,
UHL =
{
2
(
(ρH + ρL)
(
dHL + φ(1− dHL))βpiHLR+ ρMφβpimR) for θ > 12
2
(
ρM
(
dHL + φ(1− dHL))βpimR+ (ρH + ρL)φβpiHLR) for θ < 12 , (6)
UML = 2
(
ρH
(
dML + φ(1− dML))βpihR+ (ρM + ρL)φβpiMLR) .
Then, using exactly the same steps as for the case of single loan sales, it can be shown that the skin in
the game is given by dij = dˆij where
dˆHM :=
φ (piHM − pil)
φpiHM − pil ; dˆ
HL :=
{
φ(piHL−pim)
φpiHL−pim for θ >
1
2
φ(pim−piHL)
φpim−piHL for θ <
1
2 ;
dˆML :=
φ (pih − piML)
φpih − piML . (7)
4.1. Feasible Sales Strategies of Mixed Pooling and Signaling
Having established the retention strategies for each portfolio mix, we can turn to consider the feasibility
of sale of each portfolio mix. Recall that if φψ ≥ pih, then the bank will prefer to pool and sell the whole
portfolio to the market. When φψ < pih, the bank will use signaling and may sell the loans separately or
may pool two of the three potential portfolios. In the next proposition, we identify sales strategies that
are feasible and in the subsequent theorem (next subsection) we show which among the feasible strategies
maximize the bank’s payoff.
Proposition 2. [Feasible Mixed Pooling and Signaling Strategies]
1. A pooled mix of portfolios H and M is feasible when pihpiHM < φ 6
pih
ψ .
2. A pooled mix of portfolios H and L is feasible when θ > 12 and
pih
piHL
< φ 6 pihψ .
3. A pooled mix of portfolios M and L is feasible when pimpiML < φ 6
pih
ψ .
Proposition 2 identifies parameter restrictions such that mixed pooling and signaling strategies are
feasible. In comparison with single asset sales, each of these new strategies must satisfy an additional
incentive constraint. When the bank pools two of the portfolios together, its payoff must be higher than
what it could obtain by keeping the higher quality portfolio in its books.
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4.2. Optimal Sales Strategies
In comparing single loan sales and sales that use mixed pooling and signaling, the bank’s payoff from
individuals sales is given by VS in equation (5). Comparing VS with the utilities derived from mixed
pooling and signaling and comparing the mixed pooling strategies HL and ML, we obtain the following
result:
Theorem 1. [Optimal Sales Strategies]
1. If φ < pimpiML , then the bank will sell the loans singly to investors using signaling,
2. If pimpiML ≤ φ < min
{
pih
ψ ,
pih
piHL
}
, then the bank will pool portfolios M and L,
3. If pihpiHL ≤ φ < pihψ , then the bank will choose either to pool portfolios H and L or pool portfolios M
and L. For θ ∈ (1/2, (pih + pil)/(pih + 2pil)), the bank will pool portfolios H and L. For larger values
of θ, there is a critical φc(θ) ∈ (pih/piHL, pih/ψ) such that the bank chooses to pool portfolio H and
L for φ > φc(θ) and chooses to pool portfolios M and L for φ < φc(θ).
4. If φ > pihψ , then the bank will sell the loans to investors using pooling.
Proposition 2 identifies parameter values such that mixed pooling strategies are feasible. Theorem 1
shows which strategies are most profitable for different parameter values. It says that pooling the mix
of portfolios H and L, or the mix of portfolios M and L, can be optimal. The intuition is as follows.
First compare dˆh from equation (3) with dˆML from equation (7). It can be checked that dˆML < dˆh: the
skin in the game for the mixed portfolio is lower because it is only required if both loans are of high
quality, whereas, if loans are sold separately, the skin in the game is required whenever the bank has
a high quality loan. Similarly, for θ ≥ 1/2, it can be checked that dˆHL < dˆh because the skin in the
game for the portfolio HL is only required if both loans are of the same type (for θ < 1/2, the mixed
portfolio HL will not be used because it will be dominated by pooling all portfolios). Furthermore, it
can be shown that the mixed portfolio HM is never used because it is always dominated by separate
loan sales. In particular, the reduction in the cost of signaling the portfolio HM, relative to the cost of
signaling the high-quality asset, is not sufficient to compensate for the decline in the value of the pooled
portfolio relative to the value of the high-quality asset. In comparing the two mixes HL with ML, it can
be shown that dˆHL < dˆML. However, HL requires a skin in the game whenever both loans are of the
same quality, whereas the mixed portfolio ML requires a skin in the game only when both loans are of
high quality. Whether the mix HL or the mix ML dominates, will depend on the loan mix.6 A larger
value of φ decreases the skin in the game required for both portfolio mixes but this effect can be shown
to benefit HL relatively more than ML.7 We conclude from Theorem 1 that, for certain parameter values,
the mix of portfolios H and L is used, which means that low quality loans may be retained by the bank in
line with the observation of Acharya et al. (2009). Averaging across banks, a mix of high and low quality
loans will be retained. This is in line with the evidence of Keys et al. (2010).
Theorem 1 also sheds some light on how the use of pooling strategies respond to changes in the fee
and the interest rate spread. The fee f is directly related to φ. The return R is a good proxy for the
interest spread, given that the size of each loan is equal to 1. Some recent studies find that both the
6 For θ close to 1/2, the skin in the game required for the portfolio HL will be small whereas the skin in the game for ML
remains non-negligible, and hence, the portfolio HL dominates. For θ close to 1, the difference in the skin in the game is
smaller but the probability that both loans are low quality becomes smaller faster and again the portfolio HL dominates.
For intermediate values of θ, whether HL dominates or not depends on the parameter configuration of φ, pih and pil.
7 It is shown in the Appendix that a sufficient condition for HL to dominate ML is φ > φc where
φc = 1 +
(pih − pil)
(√
pih(pih + pil)− pih
)
2pi2h
.
It can be checked that φc < 2pih/(pih +pil) and therefore, there is a non-empty set of parameter values θ ≥ 1/2 and pih > pil
such that φ > φc and pih/piHL ≤ φ < pih/ψ. It can be shown that φc ≤ (10 + 7
√
7)/27 ≈ 1.0563059. Since φ = f + βψR
and βpilR > 1, the fee required on sales for this condition to be satisfied is quite low.
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fee and the spread are countercyclical. For example, Berg et al. (2016) find that higher upfront fees are
more likely in periods of higher volatility in profitability, when it is more likely that borrowers will draw
down their credit lines, and Walentin (2014) documents the countercyclicality of spreads. Given this
observed countercyclicality of spreads and fees, Theorem 1 implies that during times of financial turmoil,
e.g., 2007-08 global financial crisis, the use of pooling strategies increases. In particular, an implication
of our model is that the within portfolio variability of the distribution of predicted default rates (e.g.,
fico rates for mortgages) increases with the financial volatility.
This implication is, in principle, empirically testable. Testing this implication would require infor-
mation not only about the portfolios that banks manage but also about the assets that composed those
portfolios. There are many data sets containing ratings for individual loans issued over a number of years
and also data sets offering information about CDOs. However, what is required is not just information
about the tranches, but also information about the whole portfolios from where the tranches were cre-
ated. To our knowledge, only Faltin-Traeger and Mayer (2012) use a data set with information about
both portfolios and the assets that composed those portfolios. Unfortunately, that data set covers only
the period 2005-07 and therefore is not useful for testing the implications of our model because it does
not cover the period of the financial crisis.
5. Multiple Sales Rounds
So far, we have considered only one round of sales. In reality, banks keep recycling their assets by
selling new loans and using the proceeds to offer new ones. In this section, we demonstrate how the
analysis might be extended to multiple rounds.
When we consider multiple rounds we face two related problems: Firstly, there is an ‘integer problem’
related to the number of new loans and, secondly, there are complications in deriving the composition
of subsequent portfolios. We avoid these problems, in this section, by considering the case where the
portfolio consists of a continuum of assets. Since sales of individual assets are not feasible, we concentrate
on portfolio sales and consider only complete separation of portfolio types. In particular, suppose that in
each round the portfolio can only be one of the following three types: (a) all loans low quality (probability
ρL); (b) all loans high quality (probability ρH) and (c) half the loans low quality and half the loans high
quality (probability ρM ). This has a close correspondence to the one-period model we have previously
considered, but here we restrict the portfolio types in a very arbitrary way. To simplify the exposition,
we assume that there are two sub-periods. The multiple rounds of sales take place during the first sub-
period, which is very short (no discounting between rounds). At the end of the second sub-period, all
loans mature. The idea we try to capture is that the securitization process is very short relative to the
duration of loan contracts. With this setting, the bank faces exactly the same problem in each round
(only the size of the portfolio changes) and, therefore, the skin in the game will not vary.
As before, let di denote the fraction of a portfolio of type i (i = H,M,L) that the bank keeps on its
books. Since markets are competitive, both sold and retained loans are priced at their expected value,
Thus, the bank’s payoff from the first round V 1i is given by the value of the retained loans plus the per
unit fee f times the value of loans sold, that is,
V 1i = d
ipi + f
(
1− di) pi.
Let
W := ρHpHd
H + ρLpLd
L + ρMpMd
M ,
and
Z := ρH
(
1− dH) pH + ρL (1− dL) pL + ρM (1− dM) pM .
The term W is the expected value of loans to be retained in the next round and Z is the expected value of
loans to be sold in the next round. We will restrict our attention to problems that satisfy the restriction
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Z < 1.8 The bank’s expected payoff from the second round can be shown to be given by
V 2i = (1− di)pi(W + fZ),
and the expected payoff from the third round is
V 3i = (1− di)pi(W + fZ)Z.
Then, by induction, we have, for T ≥ 2
V Ti =
(
1− di) pi (W + fZ)ZT−2.
Adding the payoffs for all periods, we find that the bank’s total expected payoff from portfolio i is equal
to ∑∞
t=0
(
dipi +
(
1− di) pi [f + (W + fZ)Zt]) = dipi + (1− di) pi(f + W + fZ
1− Z
)
.
This expression can be compared with the corresponding expression for single round sales: dipi +(
1− di) pi(f + βψR). The difference between these expressions is that the last term includes future
fees and retention rates from subsequent rounds. We can, therefore, follow the same steps as those in
the previous section of the paper using these modified payoff functions. Conceptually, the problem is
identical but technically it is more complicated since the terms W and Z are functions of di.
In the above example, we have restricted our attention to complete separation strategies. By following
the same steps as in the last section, we can extend the analysis to portfolios. In principle, the method is
simple, but the derivations can quickly become very complicated, especially as the number of asset types,
and consequently portfolio types, increase. This complexity may, in itself, be costly and perhaps suggests
an explanation for one of the puzzling questions that Gorton and Metrick (2013) have raised in relation
to securitization; in their own words “The choice of loans to pool and sell to the SPV also remains a
puzzle. Existing theories cannot address why securitized-loan pools are homogeneous – all credit cards or
all prime mortgages, for example.” The costs of complexity mean it may better to keep securitized-loan
pools homogenous.
6. An Alternative Commitment Strategy
For pooling to be credible, some commitment by the bank to a selling strategy is required. So far, we
have assumed that the bank can commit to a menu of contracts conditional on sales taking place. In this
section, we modify this assumption and suppose the bank simply commits to a menu of contracts with
each investor separately. Thus, the bank can make credible agreements to individual investors about the
contracts that it will use in future sales but cannot credibly commit to use the same contracts with other
investors. We also assume that the bank commits to stand ready to sell all its loans.
We demonstrate that pooling equilibria are also feasible in this case and, in particular, that this form
of commitment is stronger than that assumed in Section 2. We are going to concentrate on the case of
single sales because it is easier to analyze. It will become clear that a similar argument applies to the
case of portfolio sales.
Since we want to show that pooling is feasible, we consider the situation where the bank commits to
offer a pooling contract to only one of the investors while using the signaling mechanism to sell the other
loan to a another investor. If the bank has a portfolio M, it would wish to sell the low quality loan to
the first investor using the pooling contract (at the average price) and sell the high quality loan to the
second investor using the retention strategy dh. The bank’s expected (ex ante) payoff from this second
contract is given by:
(ρH + ρM )βpihR
(
dh + φ
(
1− dh))+ ρLβpilRφ
8 An upper bound for Z is βψR, which is greater than one. Thus the assumption Z < 1 requires that the skin in the game
is significant enough. If Z ≥ 1, then the value of the bank’s sales becomes infinite.
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Given that such a strategy involves the bank selling a loan of low quality at the average price when it
has portfolio M, investors would only accept the pooling contract if they are convinced that the bank has
an incentive to offer the same contract to all other investors. Then, because of the commitment to stand
ready to sell all its assets, the bank will not use the strategy, provided that it is no worse off selling its
loan at the average price. This is true when
(ρH + ρM )βpihR
(
dh + φ
(
1− dh))+ ρLβpilRφ ≤ βψRφ.
With dh given in equation (3) and ψ = θpih + (1− θ)pil, this inequality can be simplified to
φ ≥ (2− θ)pih − (1− θ)pil
pih
. (8)
Inequality (8) says that provided φ is high enough (equivalently the fee f is high enough), offering
the pooling contract to all investors is incentive compatible. Recall from Lemma 2, that the pooling
equilibrium exists when φ ≥ pih/ψ. It is easy to check that
pih
ψ
≥ (2− θ)pih − (1− θ)pil
pih
with equality only when θ = 1. Thus, inequality (8) shows that the commitment considered in this section
is stronger than the commitment assumed in previous sections (there are some additional parameter values
where pooling is feasible) because of the commitment of the bank to sell its whole portfolio, even though it
does not commit to offer the same contract to all investors. Some commitment by thee bank is, however,
needed because if the bank were completely unable to make any commitments, then pooling would not
be credible.
7. Conclusion
We have extended the DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) signaling model from single sales of risky assets
to portfolio sales. We have identified conditions under which signaling at the portfolio level dominates
signaling at the single asset level. It has also been shown that the optimal mix of retained assets can
involve both high and low quality loans.
In order to keep the analysis simple, we have assumed that banks hold only two uncorrelated loans,
which can be one of two types, high or low quality. We comment briefly on the robustness of the model.
If there are more than two loans, then the number of potential portfolios increases and there are more
possible mixed portfolios to consider but the analysis is not fundamentally changed. Similarly, if there
are more than two types of loan, there are more potential portfolios and more qualities to signal but the
result that lower quality assets are retained is unlikely to change. Equally, as long as the returns are not
perfectly correlated across loan types, the motivation for pooling of portfolios remains and, qualitatively,
the nature of our result will be unchanged.
8. Appendix
8.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Step 1 Any solution that satisfies (IC2) and (IC6) will also satisfy (IC1), (IC3), (IC4) and (IC5).
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Proof There are six incentive compatibility constraints.
2
(
βdhpihR+ φ
(
1− dh) ph ) ≥ βdhpihR+ φ (1− dh) ph + βdlpihR+ φ (1− dl) pl (IC1)
2
(
βdhpihR+ φ
(
1− dh) ph ) ≥ 2(βdlpihR+ φ (1− dl) pl) (IC2)
βdhpihR+ φ
(
1− dh) ph + βdlpilR+ φ (1− dl) pl ≥ βdhpihR+ βdhpilR+ 2φ (1− dh) ph (IC3)
βdhpihR+ φ
(
1− dh) ph + βdlpilR+ φ (1− dl) pl ≥ βdlpihR+ βdlpilR+ 2φ (1− dl) pl (IC4)
2
(
βdlpilR+ φ
(
1− dl) pl) ≥ βdhpilR+ φ (1− dh) ph + βdlpilR+ φ (1− dl) pl (IC5)
2
(
βdlpilR+ φ
(
1− dl) pl) ≥ 2(βdhpilR+ φ (1− dh) ph) (IC6)
(IC1) states that when the portfolio type is H the bank prefers to sell each loan as type h rather
than one loan as type h and the other as type l. (IC2) states that when the portfolio type is H the
bank prefers to sell each loan as type h rather than selling each loan as type l. (IC3) states that
when the portfolio type is M the bank prefers to sell the type h loan as type h and the type l loan
as type l rather than selling both loans as type h. (IC4) states that when the portfolio type is M
the bank prefers to sell the type h loan as type h and the type l loan as type l rather than selling
both loans as type l. (IC5) states that when the portfolio type is L the bank prefers to sell each
loan as type l rather than one loan as type h and the other as type l. (IC6) states that when the
portfolio type is L the bank prefers to sell each loan as type l rather than selling each loan as type
h.
Comparing (IC1) and (IC2) it follows that if (IC2) is satisfied, so is (IC1). Comparing (IC5) and
(IC6) it follows that if (IC6) is satisfied, so is (IC5). Subtracting βdhpihR + φ
(
1− dh) ph from
both sides of (IC3) we obtain (IC2). Subtracting βdlpilR+φ
(
1− dl) pl from both sides of (IC4) we
obtain (IC6). QED
We can combine (IC2) and (IC6) to get
β
(
dh − dl)pihR ≥ φ ((1− dl) pl − (1− dh) ph ) ≥ β (dh − dl)pilR (A.1)
Step 2 ph ≥ pl.
Proof Given that bank’s payoff is increasing in ph and pl, in any signaling equilibrium at least one of
the two constraints described in Step 1 must bind. This is because we can always increase both
in such a way that leaves
(
1− dl) pl − (1− dh) ph constant. If ph = βpihR, then the lemma is
trivially satisfied. Suppose that pl = βpilR and that βpilR > ph and that (A1) is satisfied. Then
set ph = βpilR clearly increasing the bank’s payoff. Given that βψR > 1, the second inequality is
still satisfied. Increasing ph also relaxes the first constraint and therefore we have a contradiction.
QED
Step 3 dl = 0.
Proof Given that pihR > pilR, (A1) implies that d
h > dl. Further, notice that if a signaling equilibrium
exists, Step 2 implies that the bank’s payoff will be decreasing in dh and dl. Suppose that the first
constraint is not binding. Then decrease dh and dl by the same amount so that either dl = 0 or the
first constraint binds. Suppose that the second constraint is not binding. Then reduce dh and dl so
that
(
1− dl) pl − (1− dh) ph stays constant, so that either dl = 0 or the second constraint binds.
Then the lemma follows from the fact that at least one of the constraints is not binding. QED
Step 3 and (A1) imply that
βdhpihR ≥ φ
(
pl −
(
1− dh) ph ) ≥ βdhpilR (A.2)
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Step 4 pl = βpilR.
Proof Suppose not. Increasing pl relaxes the second constraint in (A2). Before we have argued that
if pl < βpilR, then it must be the case that ph = βpihR. Suppose that the first constraint binds.
Then increase pl and decrease d
h so that the constraint remains binding. This is possible because
reducing dh relaxes the constraint and because (A2) implies that dh > 0. We have a contradiction.
QED
Step 5 In a separating equilibrium the second constraint binds.
φ
(
pl −
(
1− dh) ph ) = βdhpilR (A.3)
Proof This follows from the fact that the payoff is increasing in ph and decreasing in d
h and that reducing
dh relaxes the first constraint in (A2). QED
Step 6 ph = βpihR.
Proof Solving (A3) for ph we get
ph =
(
1− 1φdh
1− dh
)
βpilR.
Changes in ph and d
h affect the bank’s payoff only when it sells a loan of type h. Substituting the
above expression in that payoff we obtain βdhpihR + βpilR
(
(φ− 1) dh) which is increasing in dh.
Then the proof follows from dph/d(d
h) > 0. QED
Setting ph = βpihR in (A3) and solving for d
h completes the proof of the lemma. QED
8.2. Proof of Proposition 1
For the case when φ < pih/ψ we compare the two sales strategies for each portfolio type separately.
a) Type L portfolio.
The bank is indifferent between selling the loans separately or as a portfolio given that in both cases its
payoff will be equal to φβpilR.
b) Type M portfolio.
The bank’s payoff from selling the loans separately is equal to
βdhpihR+ φ
(
1− dh)βpihR+ φβpilR = − (φ− 1)pihRdh + φ (pih + pil)R
and its payoff from selling them as portfolio is equal to
βdM (pih + pil)R+ φ
(
1− dM)β (pih + pil)R = − (φ− 1) (pih + pil)RdM + φ (pih + pil)R.
Comparing the two payoffs we find that the bank will sell them separately if
pihRd
h − (pih + pil)RdM < 0.
Substituting the solution for dh from equation (3) and the solution for dM from the statement of Lemma 3,
it follows that
pihRd
h − (pih + pil)RdM = − φpil(pih − pil)
2
(φpih − pil) ((φpih − pil) + (φ− 1)pil) < 0.
Therefore, the bank will sell separately the two loans.
c) Type H portfolio.
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The bank’s payoff from selling the loans separately is equal to
2
(
βdhpihR+ φ
(
1− dh)βpihR) = 2 (− (φ− 1)pihRdh + φpihR)
and its payoff from selling them as portfolio is equal to
2
(
βdHpihR+ φ
(
1− dH)βpihR) = 2 (− (φ− 1)pihRdH + φpihR)
Clearly, the bank will sell them separately if dH − dh > 0. After some simple algebraic manipulation:
dH − dh = (φ− 1) φpil(pih − pim)(pim − pil)
(φpih − pim)(φpih − pil)(φpim − pil) ,
which is positive because pih > pim > pil and φ > 1. Therefore, the bank will sell the two loans separately
using signaling.
Lastly, the proof of the second part of the proposition follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 4. QED
8.3. Proof of Proposition 2
1. piHM > ψ which implies that pih/piHM < pih/ψ.
2. piHL ≥ ψ if and only if θ ≥ 1/2, so that pih/piHL < pih/ψ if and only if θ ≥ 1/2.
3. We need to compare pim/piML and pih/ψ. It can be shown that
pim
piML
−pihψ = − (pih−pil)(1−θ)ψ2ψ(θpih+pil) < 0.Thus,
pim/piML < pih/ψ.
Then, the result follows from φpiij ≥ pii, which is the necessary condition for the mixed portfolio ij
to be sold. QED
8.4. Proof of Theorem 1
First, comparing VS , given in equation (5), with UHM , given in equation (6), and substituting for the
conditional probability piHM , we have
9
VS − UHM = (φ− 1)βR
(
(2ρH + ρM )pih
(
dHM − dh)+ ρMpildHM) . (A.4)
It is easily checked that dh > dHM . This is intuitive because the skin in the game must be larger to signal
a higher quality asset. In comparing the payoffs VS and UHM therefore, there are two effects. The mixed
portfolio has the benefit of using a lower skin in the game whenever one or both loans are of high quality.
Thus, the first term in the brackets above, (2ρH + ρM )pih(d
HM − dh), is negative. However, the mixed
portfolio also has a cost if one of the loans is low quality, because the skin in the game dHM is still required
for the mixed pooling strategy where no skin in the game is required if loans are completely separated.
It can be shown that the latter effect dominates. That is, ρMpild
HM > (2ρH + ρM )pih(d
h − dHM ).
Substituting for for dHM from equation (7) and for dh from equation (3) (and for the probability piHM
and pim) into equation (A.4) gives
VS − UHM = (φ− 1)βR
(
φ(pih − pil)2ρMpil(2ρH + ρM )
(φpih − pil) ((2ρH + ρM ) (φpih − pil) + ρMpil(φ− 1))
)
.
Since φ > 1 and pih > pil > 0 and ρM > 0, it follows that VS > UHM . Thus, the mixed HM portfolio is
always dominated by signaling.
9 For more detailed derivations please consult the Supplementary Appendix.
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Similarly, in comparing UML and VS , the skin in the game for the mixed portfolio is only required
if both loans are of high quality and the skin in the game dML is less than the skin in the game, dh,
required to signal the high quality when loans are signaled separately. Thus, we have
UML − VS = (φ− 1)βRpih
(
2ρH(d
h − dML) + ρMdh
)
and since dh > dML > 0 (which follows from pih > piML > pil), φ > 1 we have UML > VS and the mixed
portfolio ML will be preferred to signaling loans separately if it is feasible.
When θ < 1/2, pooling all three portfolios dominates the mixed portfolio HL. Therefore in comparing
the mixed portfolio HL with other strategies, we only need to consider the case θ ≥ 1/2. For θ ≥ 1/2,
the mixed portfolio HL retains the skin in the game, dHL, whenever both loans are of the high quality
or both are of the low quality. The benefit of this strategy relative to the separating strategy is given by
UHL − VS = (φ− 1)βR
(
pih (2ρH + ρM ) d
h − (2pihρH + pilρL) dHL
)
= (φ− 1)βR (pih (2ρH + ρM ) (dh − dHL)+ (pihρM − pilρL) dHL) .
Given that dHL < dh (which follows from the inequalities pih > piHL, pim > pil and φ > 1), and ρM ≥ ρL
for θ > 1/2 (and pih > pil), the above expression is always positive. Thus, the mixed portfolio HL will be
preferred to signaling loans separately if it is feasible.
Finally, we compare the payoffs from the mixed portfolios HL and ML. The mixed portfolio HL
requires a skin in the game, dHL, whenever both loans are of the same quality. In contrast the mixed
portfolio ML requires a skin in the game, dML, only when both loans are of high quality. However, the
skin in the game required for the mixed portfolio HL is lower than for the mixed portfolio ML: dHL < dML
(this follows from the inequalities pih > piHL, pim > piLM and φ > 1). Thus, we have
UHL − UML = (φ− 1)βR
(
2pihρH
(
dML − dHL)− 2pilρLdHL) . (A.5)
For θ = 1/2, dHL = 0, whereas dML > 0. Therefore for θ = 1/2, the difference UHL − UML > 0 and by
continuity there is a θ˜ such that for θ ∈ [1/2, θ˜) the difference is strictly positive. In the limit as θ → 1,
limθ→1 dHL > 0 whereas limθ→1(dML−dHL) = 0. Since ρL → 0 as θ → 1, the difference UHL−UML → 0
as θ → 1. However, it can be checked that the term ρH(dML − dHL) is declining in the limit whereas
the term ρLd
HL is nether increasing nor decreasing in the limit as θ → 1. Thus, by continuity, there is a
range of θ, (θˆ, 1) where the difference UHL−UML > 0. We can conclude that there is a range of θ where
the mixed HL portfolio dominates the ML portfolio. This range may be the interval [1/2, 1) or there may
be some values of θ interior to this interval where the ML portfolio dominates.
The skin in the game, for both mixed portfolios ML and HL, is decreasing in φ and limφ→1 dHL → 1
and limφ→1 dML → 1 for θ ∈ (1/2, 1) (dHL = 0 for θ = 1/2). Thus, the term in brackets in equation (A.5)
is decreasing in φ and is negative in the limit as φ→ 1 for θ ∈ (1/2, 1). Therefore, it is possible to find a
critical φc(θ) such that the bracketed term is positive for φ > φc(θ). It can be shown that φc(θ) < pih/piHL
for 1/2 ≤ θ < (pih + pil)/(pih + 2pil) and that pic(θ) ∈ (pih/piHL, pih/ψ) for 1 > θ > (pih + pil)/(pih + 2pil).
Defining φc := maxθ φ
c(θ), it can be shown that
φc = 1 +
(pih − pil)
(√
pih(pih + pil)− pih
)
2pi2h
.
It is clear that since pih > pil, φ
c ≥ 1 with equality only if pil = 0. For φ > φc the difference in (A.5) is
positive and the mixed portfolio HL will dominate the mixed portfolio ML for any θ ∈ [1/2, 1). It is also
easily checked that φc < 2pih/(pih+pi1). Since pih/ψ and pih/piHL are decreasing in θ and pih/ψ > pih/piHL
for θ > 1/2 with pih/ψ = pih/piHL = 2pih/(pih + pi1) for θ = 1/2, it follows that there exist values of θ, pih
and pil such that φ > φ
c and pih/piHL ≤ φ < pih/ψ.
To complete the proof we note that the inequalities pih > pim and piHL <piML imply that
pim
piML
< pihpiHL .
Hence, considering each of the statements of the theorem in turn:
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1. Follows from pim/piML < pih/piHL and the the necessary conditions φpiML ≥ pim and φpiHL ≥ pih,
that neither the mixed portfolio ML nor the mixed portfolio HL will be sold for φ < pim/piML.
Neither will the mixed portfolio HM be sold because, as we have shown above, it is dominated by
signaling of separate loan sales, VS > UHM .
2. For θ < 1/2, pih/ψ < pih/piHL and therefore the condition φpiHL ≥ pih for the mixed portfolio
HL to be sold is not satisfied. The mixed portfolio ML may be sold because φ ≥ pim/piML and
since UML > VS , this portfolio dominates separate loan sales, which in turn dominates the mixed
portfolio HM.
3. Since pim/piML < pih/piHL ≤ φ, the necessary conditions for the sale of the mixed portfolios ML and
HL are both satisfied. Since φ < pih/ψ, pooling does not dominate these mixed portfolios. Since
UML > VS and UHL > VS , both mixed portfolios are better than signaling loans separately. The
comparison of the two mixed portfolios for θ ≥ 1/2 depends on the sign of UHL − UML, which as
shown above is positive for θ near to one and θ near to 1/2 and is such that for φ > φc, the mixed
portfolio HL dominates for all θ ∈ [1/2, 1).
4. Follows from the domination of the pooling strategy when φ ≥ pih/ψ.
QED
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9. Supplementary Appendix (not intended for publication)
9.1. Portfolio Sales
Let 2pi equal the price that the bank is willing to sell a portfolio of type i (that is pi denotes half the
portfolio price). Investor participation requires that
pH 6 βpihR, pM 6 βpimR ≡ βpiMR and pL 6 βpilR (S1)
Suppose that the bank’s portfolio type is type H. Under a signaling equilibrium, the bank’s expected
payoff from the sale of its portfolio is equal to 2
(
βdHpihR+ φ
(
1− dH) pH ). The interpretation is
similar to that for the case for single loan sales. Similar arguments show that the bank’s expected payoff
when its portfolio is type M is equal to 2
(
βdMpimR + φ
(
1− dM) pM)and its expected payoff when its
portfolio is type L is equal to 2
(
βdLpilR+ φ
(
1− dL) pL ).
The bank will prefer to sell a fraction of a type i portfolio to investors rather than keeping it on its
books if the following condition is satisfied:
βdipiiR+ φ
(
1− di) pi ≥ βpiiR
or
φpi ≥ βpiiR (S2)
where piH = pih, piM =
pih+pil
2 and piL = pil.
For signaling to be effective the following incentive compatibility constraints must also be satisfied:
βdHpihR+ φ
(
1− dH) pH ≥ βdMpihR+ φ (1− dM) pM (SIC1)
βdHpihR+ φ
(
1− dH) pH ≥ βdLpihR+ φ (1− dL) pL (SIC2)
βdMpimR+ φ
(
1− dM) pM ≥ βdHpimR+ φ (1− dH) pH (SIC3)
βdMpimR+ φ
(
1− dM) pM ≥ βdLpimR+ φ (1− dL) pL (SIC4)
βdLpilR+ φ
(
1− dL) pL ≥ βdMpilR+ φ (1− dM) pM (SIC5)
βdLpilR+ φ
(
1− dL) pL ≥ βdHpilR+ φ (1− dH) pH (SIC6)
Each of the above expressions is equal to half the expected payoff of the corresponding portfolio. (SIC1)
states that when the portfolio type is H the bank prefers to sell it as type H rather than selling it as
type M . (SIC2) states that when the portfolio type is H the bank prefers to sell it as type H rather than
selling it as type L. (SIC3) states that when the portfolio type is M the bank prefers to sell it as type M
rather than selling it as type H. (SIC4) states that when the portfolio type is M the bank prefers to sell
it as type M rather than selling it as type L. (SIC5) states that when the portfolio type is L the bank
prefers to sell it as type L rather than selling it as type M . (SIC6) states that when the portfolio type
is L the bank prefers to sell it as type L rather than selling it as type H.
The constraints can be written as:
βpihR
(
dH − dM) ≥ φ ((1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH) (SIC1*)
βpihR
(
dH − dL) ≥ φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dH) pH) (SIC2*)
βpimR
(
dH − dM) 6 φ ((1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH) (SIC3*)
βpimR
(
dM − dL) ≥ φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) (SIC4*)
βpilR
(
dM − dL) 6 φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) (SIC5*)
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βpilR
(
dH − dL) 6 φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dH) pH) (SIC6*)
We can now prove Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
9.1.1. Proof of Lemma 3
Step S1 dH > dM > dL.
Proof The first inequality follows from (SIC1*) and (SIC3*). The second inequality follows from
(SIC4*) and (SIC5*). Notice that (SIC2*) and (SIC6*) also imply that dH > dL. QED
Step S2 Any solution that satisfies (SIC1*), (SIC3*), (SIC4*) and (SIC5*) will also satisfy (SIC2*) and
(SIC6*).
Proof
βpihR
(
dH − dL) ≥ βpihR (dH − dM)+ βpimR (dM − dL) ≥
φ
((
1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH + (1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) =
φ
((
1− dL) pL − (1− dH) pH)
The second weak inequality follows from adding (SIC1*) and (SIC4*).
βpilR
(
dH − dL) 6 βpimR (dH − dM)+ βpilR (dM − dL) 6
φ
((
1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH + (1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) =
φ
((
1− dL) pL − (1− dH) pH)
The second weak inequality follows from adding (SIC3*) and (SIC5*). QED
We can combine (SIC1*) and (SIC3*) to get
βpihR
(
dH − dM) ≥ φ ((1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH) ≥ βpimR (dH − dM) (S3)
We can combine (SIC4*) and (SIC5*) to get
βpimR
(
dM − dL) ≥ φ ((1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM) ≥ βpilR (dM − dL) (S4)
Step S3 pL 6 pM 6 pH .
Proof
a) Suppose that pL > pM . At least one of the following is true: the first constraint in (S4) binds or
pL = βpilR.
We first show that in both cases the fist constraint in (S3) must bind. Suppose that pL = βpilR. Then
pM < βpilR implies that the second constraint in (S4) does not bind (given that it does not bind for
pL = pM = βpilR). Given that bank’s payoff is increasing in pM the first constraint in (S3) must
bind. Next, suppose that pL < βpilR. Then the first constraint in (S4) binds which implies that
the second constraint does not bind and, as before, it must be the case that the first constraint in
(S3) binds.
Decrease dM and pM so that the bank’s payoff βd
MpimR+φ
(
1− dM) pM remains constant. Notice that
Step S1 implies that dM > 0, and that if pM = 0, the first constraint in (S3) is not satisfied. Totally
differentiating and rearranging we find that the changes must satisfy dpM
d(dM )
= φpM−βpimR
φ(1−dM ) where the
numerator must be positive for the bank to be willing to sell a portfolio of type M . The change
does not affect (S4) but relaxes the first constraint in (S3). Therefore, we have a contradiction.
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b) Suppose that pM > pH . The inequality pH < βpihR implies that the second constraint in (S3) binds.
It must also be true that pM < βpimR (given it does not bind for pH = pM = βpimR). But then it
follows that the second constraint in (S4) must bind (if not increase pM , thus, raising the bank’s
payoff). Increase dM and pM so that the second constraint still binds. But given that pimR > pilR
the change relaxes the second constraint in (S3) and also increases the bank’s payoff. Therefore,
we have a contradiction. QED
Step S4 dL = 0.
Proof Suppose that the first constraint in (S4) does not bind. Then decrease dM and dL by the same
amount so that either dL = 0 or the first constraint binds. Suppose that the second constraint is not
binding. Then reduce dM and dL so that
(
1− dL) pL − (1− dM) pM stays constant so that either
dL = 0 or the second constraint binds. Then, as long as the changes have not violated the constraints
in (S3), the lemma follows from the fact that at least one of the inequalities is not binding. If one
of the constraints in (S3) is violated, then decrease dH either by the same amount as dM when the
first constraint is the one that binds or decrease dH so that to keep
(
1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH
constant if the second constraint is the one that binds. QED
Step S5 In a signaling equilibrium the second constraint in (S3) and the second constraint in (S4) bind.
Further, pL = βpilR.
Proof Suppose that the second constraint in (S3) does not bind. Then we have pH = βpihR. But then
the constraint can be relaxed by decreasing dH and thus increasing the bank’s payoff. We have a
contradiction. Next, suppose that the second constraint in (S4) does not bind. Then, it must be
the case that the first constraint in (S3) binds. If pM < βpimR, then increase pM till either the
second constraint binds or pM = βpimR. (This is feasible because the first constraint in (S3) does
not bind.) Thus, we have a contradiction. In contrast, if pM = βpimR, decrease d
M , thus, relaxing
the constraint. We also have a contradiction. Given that the second constraint in (S4) binds, we
have pL = βpilR. QED
Then, a signaling equilibrium must satisfy (S2) and the following constraints:
φ
((
1− dM) pM − (1− dH) pH) = βpimR (dH − dM) (S5)
and
φ
(
βpilR−
(
1− dM) pM) = βpilRdM (S6)
Step S6 pM = βpimR, pH = βpihR.
Proof
a) Solve (S5) for pH to get
pH =
1− dM
1− dH pM +
β
φ
pimR
dH − dM
1− dH .
Changes in pH and d
H affect the bank’s payoff only when it sells a portfolio of type H. Substituting
the above expression in that payoff we obtain
βdHpihR+ φ
((
1− dM) pM + β
φ
pimR
(
dH − dM))
which is increasing in dH . Then the first part of Step S6 follows from dpH
d(dH)
> 0.
b) Solve (S6) for pM to get
pM = βpilR
(
1
1− dM +
1
φ
dM
1− dM
)
.
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Changes in pM and d
M affect the bank’s payoff only when it sells a portfolio of type M . Substituting
the above expression in that payoff we obtain
βdMpimR+ φβpilR
(
1 +
1
φ
dM
)
which is increasing in dM . Then the second part of Step S6 follows from dpM
d(dM )
> 0. QED
To complete the proof of the lemma substitute the results of Step S6 in (S5) and (S6). Solve (S6) for
dM . Then substitute the latter solution in (S5) and solve for dH .
dH =
φ
(
pih
pim
− 1
)
+ dM (φ− 1)
φ pihpim − 1
After substituting the solution for dM in the above expression and subtract the denominator from the
numerator we find that the difference is equal to dM − 1 < 0 and therefore dH < 1. Lastly, dH − dM =
φ( pihpim−1)(1−d
M)
φ
pih
pim
−1 > 0. QED.
9.1.2. Proof of Lemma 4
We consider the possibility of pooling equilibria. If a pooling equilibrium exists, then the bank will
not keep any fraction of the portfolio on its books. The maximum price that investors would be willing
to pay for a portfolio (assuming that the bank is willing to sell all types of portfolios) is equal to 2βψR.
If the bank keeps a type H portfolio on its books, its payoff will be equal to 2βpihR. If the bank sells
the portfolio to investors, its payoff will be 2βφψR. Then, the bank will prefer to keep the portfolio on
its books if φ < pihψ . Clearly, if the bank is willing to sell the type H portfolio, it will also be willing to
sell portfolios of types M and L. The above argument together with Lemma 3 and (S2) imply that if
φ < pihψ , then the bank will sell the portfolio to investors using the skin in the game as a signal.
Next, we need to compare signaling and pooling when φ ≥ pihψ . The bank’s payoff from pooling is
equal to10
WP = VP = 2φβψR = 2φβ (θpih + (1− θ)pil)R.
The bank’s payoff from signaling when the loans are sold together as a portfolio is equal to
WS = θ
22βpihR
(
dH + φ
(
1− dH))+
2θ (1− θ)β (pih + pil)R
(
dM + φ
(
1− dM))+ (1− θ)22βpilRφ.
WS − VP = −2θβpihR (φ− 1) dH − θ (1− θ) 2 (φ− 1) dM < 0.
QED.
9.2. Further Details of Proof of Theorem 1
In comparing the separate loans and portfolio HM we have (repeating (A.4))
VS − UHM = (φ− 1)βR
(
(2ρH + ρM )pih
(
dHM − dh)+ ρMpildHM) .
Substituting for for dHM from equation (7) and for dh from equation (3) gives
VS − UHM = (φ− 1)βR
(
φ(piHM − pil)pilρM
(φpiHM − pil) − pih
φ(pih − pil)
(φpih − pil) +
φ(piHM − pil)
(φpiHM − pil) (2ρH + ρM )
)
.
10 The bank’s payoff from pooling does not depend on whether the loans are sold separately or as a portfolio.
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Substituting for the conditional probabilities piij and pim = (1/2)(pih + pil) gives
VS − UHM = (φ− 1)βR
(
φ(pih − pil)2ρMpil(2ρH + ρM )
(φpih − pil) ((2ρH + ρM ) (φpih − pil) + ρMpil(φ− 1))
)
,
as appears in the proof in the main text.
In comparing UHM and UML we have
UHL − UML = (φ− 1)βR
(
2pihρH
(
dML − dHL)− 2pilρLdHL) .
Substituting for dML and dHL gives
UHL − UML = (φ− 1)βRpilρLdHL
((
pihρH
pilρL
)(
dML − dHL
dHL
)
− 1
)
.
The sign of UHL −UML depends on the sign of the bracketed term. Substituting for dHL and dML gives(
pihρH
pilρL
)(
dML − dHL
dHL
)
− 1 = pihρH(φ− 1)(pihpim − piHLpiML)
pilρL(piHL − pim)(φpih − piML) − 1.
Differentiating this term with respect to φ gives the derivative
pihρH(pih − piML)(pihpim − piHLpiML)
pilρL(piHL − pim)(φpih − piML)2 .
This is positive because pih > piML, piHL > pim and pihpim > piHLpiML. Hence, there will a critical value of
φ, φc such that UHL R UML and φ R φc. This critical value of φ depends on parameters and in particular
depends on θ because ρi is a function of θ. Hence, we write φ
c(θ). Solving
pihρH(φ− 1)(pihpim − piHLpiML)
pilρL(piHL − pim)(φpih − piML) − 1 = 0
gives
φc(θ) = 1 +
pil(piHL − pim)(pih − piML)ρL
pih (pihpim − piHLpiML) ρH + pil (pim − piML) ρL = 1 +
pil(pih − pil)(1− θ)(2θ − 1)
pih (pihθ2 + pil(1− θ)2)
where the second equality follows from substituting for the the conditional probabilities and for the
probabilities ρi. It follows that φ
c(θ) > 1 for θ ∈ (1/2, 1) and φc(1/2) = φc(1) = 1. We are interested in
pih/piHL ≤ φ < pih/ψ. We have
pih
ψ
− φc(θ) = pih
pihθ + pil(1− θ) − φ
c(θ) =
(pih − pil)(1− θ)(pih(pih − pil)θ2 + pil(1− θ)(pih − pil(2θ − 1))
pih (pihθ + pil(1− θ)) (pihθ2 + pil(1− θ)2) .
Since terms on the LHS are positive for θ ∈ [1/2, 1], we have φc(θ) < pih/ψ for θ ∈ [1/2, 1). Equally,
φc(θ)− pih
piHL
= φc(θ)− θ
2 + (1− θ)2
pihθ2 + pil(1− θ)2 =
(pih − pil)(1− θ) (pil(2θ − 1)− pih(1− θ))
pihθ2 + pil(1− θ)2 .
The above term has the same sign as the sign of pil(2θ − 1)− pih(1− θ). Thus, we have
φc(θ)− pih
piHL
R 0 as θ R pih + pil
pih + 2pil
.
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It is checked that 2/3 < (pih + pil)/(pih + 2pil) ≤ 1 with the second weak inequality holding as equality
only if pil = 1. It is possible to find the θ
∗ that maximizes φc(θ). Solving gives
θ∗ =
(pih − pil) +
√
pih(pih + pil)
3pih − pil .
Substituting into φc(θ) gives
φc := φc(θ∗) = 1 +
(pih − pil)
(√
pih(pih + pil)− pih
)
2pi2h
.
The maximum value of φc occurs when pil = (1/9)(2
√
7 − 1)pih ≈ 0.476834pih. Hence, substituting into
the the formula for φc(θ∗) gives
φc ≤ 1
27
(
10 + 7
√
7
)
≈ 1.0563059.
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